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Abstract 
This paper establishes two results. First, that a corrected version of the propositional part of 
Delgrande’s conditional logic corresponds to Adams’ extended probability logic and has both 
an infinitesimal and a noninfinitesimal probability semantics. Second, that there is a defect in 
Delgrande’s default logic: it may produce inconsistent extensions. 0 1998 Elsevier Science B.V. 
All rights reserved. 
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1. Introduction 
Delgrande [9] has developed a default logic which is based on a first-order conditional 
logic [8]. This paper focuses on the propositional part of Degrande’s conditional logic [8, 
Sections l.-51 which Delgrande calles NP. NP is defective in a certain point; the corrected 
version is Icalled NP+. The next sections are organized as follows. Section 2 recapitulates 
NP and NE’+. Section 3 interpretes NP+ in the light of Adams’ extended probability logic. 
Section 4 reveals a serious defect in Delgrande’s default logic. 
2. Delgramde’s conditional logic and its corrected version 
The language of NP, LNP, is formed by standard formation rules from the following 
alphabet: propositional variables PV = (pi 1 i E w}, truth-functional propositional con- 
nectives 1, A, v, + (material implication), T (Verum), _L (Falsum), and the non-truth- 
functional conditional operator =k. a!, B, . . . range over arbitrary formulas of LNP and 
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r,A,... over arbitrary sets of such formulas. Lp denotes the truth-functional sublanguage 
of LNP. The intended reading of u =+ /I is ifa, then normally /3. Delgrande excludes nested 
occurrences of + from LNP. He argues that they are neither needed nor do they make good 
sense in their intended reading [8, p. 1151, [9, p. 681 (but cf. [6]). 
LNP gets interpreted by a possible world semantics. An NP-model is a triple ( W, R, P) 
where (1) W is a nonempty set of possible worlds zu, 1~1, . . . , (2) R E W x W is a (2a) 
re$exive, (2b) transitive and (2~) forward-connected relation over W, and (3) P : PV + 
2w is the interpretation function [9, p. 68f1, [8, p. 1141. Hence, an NP-frame (W, R) is a 
(forward-connected) preordering. The “normality”-preordering relation is defined as the 
inverse of R: w1 <R w2 := RW~WI, with <R and =_R defined accordingly (“:=” means 
“identity by definition”). w 1 <R w2 means informally that w 1 is at least as normal as ~2. 
“(M, w) /= a” stands for “formula a is true at world w in model M”. Its definition for 
Lp-formulas is standard. Set W M := the world set of model M; ]]a]lM := (w E WM 1 
(M, w) + a); and for w E WM and U G W”, f(w, U) := {WI E U I WI <R w and 
-3~2 E U: w2 <R wt ). Then the truth clause for conditionals is as follows [9, Definitions 
3.1-3.21: 
(M, w) l= cx * B iff f(w, Ilall”) C B 
-in words, a j #I is true at w in M iff ,B is true at all czl-worlds w’ which are most normal 
among all a-worlds R-accessible from w. 
Classical propositional inference is denoted by k. The conditional logic NP is 
axiomatized by a standard set of axioms and rules for l-, together with the following 
axioms and rules for + [8, p. 11.51: 2
(R) cx =+ (Y (Rejlexivity). 
(And) ((a * B) A (a * v)) + (a * B A v). 
(CC) ((a * /?) A (a A fi * v>) -+ (a! * y) (Cautious Cut). 
(Or) ((a * Y) A (B * Y)) --, (a v B * Y). 
(WRM) ((a =+ y) A -(a =+ -B)) + (a A jf? j y) (Weak RationaZ Monotony). 
(RW) From k- (p + v) infer (a =+ /3) + (a! =+ v) (Right Weakening). 
(LLE) From k ((11 t, /?) infer (a =k v) u (#I + y) (Left Logical Equivalence). 
By definition, r kNp a! iff kNp (A rf + a) for some finite subset I”, G r. Delgrande 
[8] proves that the conditional logic NP is correct and weakly complete for the class 
of all NP-models.-1 introduce the name ‘WRM’ in order to emphasize the difSerence 
between (WRM) and the full rule of rational monotony (RM) of Lehmann and Magidor 
[ 15, p. 181. (RM) allows to derive (11 A /? + y from u G- y if 01 =+ -/I is not derivable 
from the knowledge base. In contrast, (WRM) allows this inference only if -(o =$ -B) 
* (R) corresponds to Delgrande’s ID, (And) to CC, (CC) to RT, (Or) to CC’, (WRM) to CV, (RW) to RCM, and 
(LLE) to RCEA. Delgrande claims (LLE) to be derivable. 
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is derivable from the knowledge base. The system of [15] cannot express this difference 
because its language does not include negated conditionals. (WRM) is monotonic (like all 
other NP-inferences), while (RM) is nonmonotonic. 
The R-equivalence classes ]] w ]] R := (w’ I w’ e_R w} of NP-models are clusters of worlds 
with the same rank of normality [ 13, p. 821. These clusters are strictly ordered by relation 
[<RI := {(hi, 1w21) I wl <R w2). 
Because R is forward-connected, the ordering of clusters has the structure of an inverted 
tree [8, p. 1121. Here a significant simplification is possible. A model M is called generated 
iff all worlds w in WM are accessible from a certain “generating” world w* in WM by 
an R-path (W* ‘R W1 ‘R ... -+ R w). Since completeness is reducible to completeness 
for generated models [ 13, p. 811, NP is correct and weakly complete for all generated 
NP-models. Therefore we restrict from now on our semantics to generated NP-models. 
A generated NP-model is a linear ordering of clusters with the schematic structure 
IWlR ‘R ... >R Iw~IR >R *.., 
where w is its generating world. 
Finite generated NP-models are exactly like the finite ranked models of [2,3,12,15] (for 
more comparisons of this sort cf. Nejdl [ 161). Znfinite generated NP-models are “almost” 
like the infinite ranked models of [ 15, p. %l]-except for a crucial difference. Generated 
NP-models admit infinite descending chains 
t” >,p w1 >R w2 > . . . 
of a-worlds. Here, f(w, Ilo]]) = 0, although ]J(Y(] # 0. As a result, NP does not contain the 
important axiom of Cautious Monotony: 
This de&t has been reported by Lehmann and Magidor [15, p. 231. It was presumably 
not intended by Delgrande, because it contradicts several important claims of him. For 
example, Delgrande’s proof of the decidability of NP [8, p. 1191 presupposes that NP has 
the finite model property (f.m.p.). But NP cannot have the f.m.p. because T ==+ I is valid in 
all generated NP-models with an infinite descending chain of worlds [ 15, p. 41, though not 
valid in any finite NP-model. In Section 4 it is shown that also several claims of Delgrande 
about his default logic are true only if such infinite descending chains are excluded. For 
example, Delgrande assumes the additional axiom of Possibility: 
(Poss) a -+ Oa, where Ocx := ~((2 j la). 
But infinite descending a-chains make (Poss) NP-invalid. 
The defect of NP can be repaired by easy means. The minimal semantical repairing 
step is to require from NP-models the smoothness condition of [ 14, p. 1821 and [ 15, pp. 7, 
211. An NP-model M is smooth iff for every a! E LNp with I]o]IM # 0 there exists an 
<R-minimal a-world in M. Smooth generated NP-models are exactly the ranked models 
of [15, p. 211. (Note that finite NP-models are automatically smooth.) Syntactically one 
has to add the two axioms (CM) and (Poss). We call the resulting calculus NP+. Thus 
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NP+ = NP + (CM) + (Poss). NP+ is correct and weakly complete for the class of all 
smooth NP-models (cf. Section 3). An equivalent but more economic axiomatization of 
NP+ is possible by replacing the four axioms (R) + (LLE) + (RW) + (And) by the rule of 
Supruclussiculity [ 11, p. 20 1 ] : 
(SC) From I- ((Y + ,B) infer cx j @. 
With Class for “classical logic”, we summarize this schematically as follows: 
NP+ = Class + (SC) + (CC) + (Or) + (CM) + (WRM) + (Poss). 
If we remove (WRM) and (Poss) from NP+ and restrict NP+ to implications (or inferences) 
between conditionals, we obtain the calculus P of preferential entailment after [14, 
Section 51 and [15, p. 5fl (cf. also [16]). Schematically, P = (Class) + (SC) + (CC) + 
(Or) + (CM). Let us explain the schematical relation of P and NP+ to Adams’ work. 
Adams has developed (at least) three systems of probability logic, namely: 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
P has been developed and probabilistically interpreted in Adams [2]. 
P, := P + (EEFQ): “From y -a! and o =X I infer (arbitrary) j3 j y”. This is 
Adams’ classical system, developed in [ 11. The probabilistic difference to P is 
that in P, probability functions are restricted to those which are proper for the 
conditionals, which means that the probabilities of their antecedents are alway 
greater than zero. 
P+ = P + (WRM). This is Adams’ extended probability logic developed in [3]. Here 
Adams extends P by allowing disjunctions of conditionals in the conclusion of P+- 
inferences and by adding the disjunctive version of (WRM): 
(dWRM) (o =+ v) + ((a * -B) ” (a A B * v)). 
The interconnection between P and Adams’ classical system is well known [ 17, p. 4861, 
[ 15, Section 4.31. In contrast, Adams’ extended system P+ is widely unknown. In Section 3 
it is shown that Adams’ disjunctive extension is effectively equivalent with the admission 
of arbitrary truth-functional combinations of conditionals, as in Delgrande’s language. 
The corrected Delgrande logic NPf arises from Adams’ P+ just by adding the axiom 
(Poss) which handles the relation between conditional and nonconditional formulas: 3 
NP+ = P+ + (Poss). This leads to a useful probabilistic interpretation of NP+, which 
is presented in Section 3. 
3. Probabilistic semantics for NP+ after Adams 
In what follows, L:, 131, . . . range over finite sets of conditionals L, L1 , . . . E L, and 
C,Cl,.. . range overfinite sets of truth-functional formulas (“contingencies”) C, Cl, . . . E C. 
The restriction to finite premise sets is necessary because probabilistic entailment (cf. De- 
finition 1 below) is noncompact [l, p. 521. A r and V r denote the conjunction and 
3 Adams [1,3] handles contingent sentences in the style of counterfactual logic, where a! and T + a are 
interderivable. For default logic this is inadequate: “being true” does not imply “being most normal” but merely 
“being possible” [8, p. 1261, [16]. 
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disjunction, respectively, of all formulas in the finite formula set r. As usual we set 
A{ v} = V{ v} = y , A 0 := T and V 0 := 1. A positive NP+-inference has the general 
form Cl U C kNP+ V 132. Every NP+-th eorem can be transformed into a propositionally 
equivalent ;set of positive NP+-derivable implications of the form A(,!Zt U C) -+ V C2 (by 
transforming disjuncts of the CNF into suitable implications), which corresponds to a co- 
valid set of positive NP+-inferences. Therefore, NP+-validity and NP+-theoremhood can 
be completely reduced to the validity and theoremhood of positive NP+-inferences. 
Motivatmns for a probabilistic foundation of reasoning with default conditionals can be 
found, among other work, in [ 17, Chapter lo], [ 121, [ 181. We call 
p(B/(Y) := p(;(;,“) 
the conditi~onal probability associated with the conditional (11 + fi. Given the intended 
meaning, this probability should be “sufficiently high”. Thereby, ~@/a) is set to 1 iff 
p(a) = 0. If L abbreviates a! + /3, then p(L) abbreviates ~@/a!). u(L) := (1 - p(L)) 
denotes the conditional uncertainty associated with L. Let Lfp be the jnite propositional 
language of a finite knowledge base, and 52 the finite set of truth assignments u, u, w, _ . 
to the propositional variables of L{. I7 stands for the set of all probability functions 
p : L? -+ [O, l] (defined in the usual way). We identify truth assignments with possible 
worlds. p E 17 is called proper for C iff p(C) > 0 for all C E C. 
Definition 1. Cl U C p+-entails V C2 iff for every (arbitrary small) 6 > 0 there exists 
an E > 0 such that for every p E 17 proper for C: if VL E L1: p(L) > 1 - E, then 
3L’ E fz2: p(L’) > 1 - s. 
Important for the procedural aspect is the concept of yielding, which holds between 
a set of conditionals and an ordered set of conditionals [3, p. 2641, [4, p. 17191. Some 
preliminary notions: a world w E D verifies [falsifies] a conditional cz + /l iff 01 A /l 
[a! A -B, respectively] is true at w; w falsifies L iff w falsifies some L E LT; w confirms _C 
iff w verifies some L E .C and does not falsify ,C. 
Definition 2. _C yields (L 1, . . . , L, ) iff for all worlds w E a: 
(Yl) if w confirms C, then w verifies at least one Li (1 < i < n), and 
(Y2) if rz = 0, or if w falsifies some Lk (1 < k 6 n) and does not verify any Li with 
i 61 k, then w falsifies .C. 
Theorem 3 shows that the system NP+ unifies four different but equivalent perspectives: 
(1) normal world semantics, (2) injinitesimal probability semantics, (3) noninjinitesimal 
probability semantics, and (4) logical calculus. The fifth equivalence-(5) in Theorem 3- 
enables a semi-tractable procedure for testing NP+-entailment (Lemma 6 below).4 In 
Theorem 3( 3) we stipulate c 0 = 0 and fl0 = 1. 
4 It is a consequence of Theorem 3(5) that factual premises which are NPf-consistent with the conditional 
premises are irrelevant for the NP+-derivation of conditionals. 
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Theorem 3. For every L1, C, L2, the followingjve conditions are equivalent: 
(1) /j(Ct UC) -+ V L2 is valid in all$nite ranked models. 
(2) Cl U C p+-entails V L2. 
(3) For all p E I7 properfor C : xLEL, u(L) 3 nLE~2 u(L). 
(4) Ll UC hTp+ v c2. 
(5) Some subset of L1 either yields an ordered subset of L2, or yields AC =+ 1. 
Infinitesimal probability semantics is well known. In contrast, noninfinitesimal probabil- 
ity semantics is a new perspective. It is based on probabilistic inequality relations. Another 
kind of noninfinitesimal probability semantics for the system P has recently been proposed 
by Benferhat, Dubois and Prade [5]: it establishes for a restricted class of probability func- 
tions (so-called dynamic bound systems) that P-entailment coincides with preservation of 
conditional probability 3 0.5. In contrast, the probabilistic semantics of Theorem 3(3) 
holds for all probability functions. It does not preserve any exact lower probability bound, 
but it preserves high probability, which is important in practical prediction situations. In 
[ 181 it is shown how this probabilistic semantics can be used to furnish default logic with a 
propagation mechanism for numerical lower probability bounds. This propagation mech- 
anism outputs a lower probability bound of the conclusion conditional, given lower proba- 
bility bounds of the premise conditionals. Though the lower bound of the conclusion condi- 
tional may decrease with an increasing set of premise conditionals, it is a good approxima- 
tion to the tight bound (i.e., to the best among all probabilistically valid bounds; cf. [lo]). 
Theorem 4 is an easy consequence of Theorem 3, given the remark in the first paragraph 
of this section. 
Theorem 4. NP+ is correct and weakly complete for smooth NP-models (thus for ranked 
models, finite NP-models, finite ranked models). 
Procedure 5 tests NP+-entailment by searching for an Gr-subset X and an ordered 
&subset J’ such that X yields Y, or X yields /\C + -L (Theorem 3(5)). It is based 
on a polynomial number (in the size of IfZr ) + 11321) of propositional satisfiability tests 
(Lemma 6(2)) and thus is itself polynomial if C and CT (:= (a + #l 1 a =+ b E Li)) 
consist of Horn clauses. Initially, X = Li and y = &. The procedure cycles between 
Steps 2 and 3. Step 2.1 successively removes those premise conditionals from X for 
which condition (Yl) of “X yields p (Definition 2) is violated. The “violating” worlds 
are collected in the singleton-clusters Tie, , . . , qri. When no further premise conditional 
is removable and y is nonempty (Step 2.2.1), the procedure switches to Step 3. Here a 
maximally long ordering of conclusion conditionals, y ‘, is constructed which satisfies 
condition (Y2) of “X yields Y”. If JJk = Y in Step 3.2, then X yields Y. Otherwise Y \ yk 
is a nonempty set of conclusion conditionals for which condition (Y2) of “X yields JJ” is 
violated; the “violating” worlds get collected in Step 4, and the procedure switches back 
to Step 2. And so on. When Y is empty and no further premise conditional is removable 
(Step 2.2.2), the procedure switches finally to Step 5, which searches for a world for which 
condition (Y2) of “X yields l\C j I” is violated (condition (Yl) cannot be violated at 
this point). It terminates in the success-case at Step 5.2, else at Step 5.1. 
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Procedure 5 (NP+-inference). 
Input: a trijple (Ll, C, L2). 
Output: YES if L1 UC FNr+ V,&. Else: NO, and a ranked countermodel to this 
inference. 
Stepl:Seti,j,k=O; X=Lt,y=C2,yk=0. 
Step 2: Search for X E X and u E 52 such that u verifies X, confirms X but does not verify 
any Y E Y 
2.1 If X and u found, set X =X \ {X); q’ = {u}; j = j + 1. Go to Step 2. 
2.2 Else: Set j = 0. 
2.2. :I If Y # 0, go to Step 3. 
2.2.2 Else (if Y = 0), go to Step 5. 
Step 3: Seaxch for Y E Y \ yk such that every u E fi which falsifies Y and does not verify 
any Y’ E 3;‘k falsifies X. 
3.1 If Y found: set k = k + 1, Yk = yk-’ U {Y}. Go to Step 3. 
3.2 If Y not found and Y = yk, halt. Output: YES. 
3.3 If Y not found and Y # yk, go to Step 4. 
Step 4: Reiurn for each Y E Y \ yk the world uy which falsifies Y but does neither verify 
some Y’ E yk nor falsify X. Set: Fi = {uy ] Y E Y \ yk}, Y = yk, i = i + 1, and go to 
Step 2. 
Step 5: Search for u E D such that u verifies /j C and does not falsify X. 
5.1 If u not found, then halt. Output: YES. 
5.2 Else (if u found), set TC = (u], and halt. Output: NO, and the ranked 
model T$, . . . , Ton’, Fo, . . . , Tie, . . . , Tini, 4, . . . , Tc. 
In the rest of this section we show how Theorem 3 is proved. We omit all proof parts 
which are recoverable from the literature. The proof of Lemma 6 is straightforward; for 
details cf. 13amber [4]. 
Lemma 6. 
(1) Procedure 5 is a correct and complete decision procedure for condition (5) of 
Theorem 3. 
(2) Its worst-case behaviour are O((l,Cl 1 + IL21>3> propositional satis$abiZity tests. 
(3) The ranked model returned in Step 5.2 is a countennodel to the inference. 
Proof of Theorem 3. The proof of the equivalence of conditions (l)-(5) of Theorem 3 
will now be established by proving 
(a) (3) imphes (2) implies (1) implies (5) implies (3) and 
(b) (4) implies (1) and (5) implies (4). 
(a) proves the equivalence of(l), (2) (3) and (5), and (b) proves their equivalence with (4). 
(3) implies (2): 
Straightforward (cf. [4, p. 17161). q 
(2) implies: (1): The proof can be recovered from Adams [3, p. 272f1 as follows. Assume 
~(1) and let M := Co,. . . , C, be a countermodel to the inference Lt U C &,+ f,2, with 
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Ci the cluster of worlds of rank i. The countermodel contains only those worlds which 
are “needed’-these are at most z := ]Ct I+ ],C2 1 + 1 worlds. It is then shown that the 
probability function defined as in [3, p. 2721 satisfies the following two inequalities: (i) for 
all L E Lt: u(L) < ZE, and (ii) for all L E C2: u(L) 3 (1 - E)/z, where E is arbitrarily 
small. 5 It follows that condition (2) is violated. A more elegant proof of “(2) implies (1)” 
for the system P is given in [15, p. 27f, pp. 5%581. q 
(1) implies (5): That ~(5) implies -( 1) is a consequence of Lemma 6(l)+(3). 
(5) implies (3): The quasi-conjunction of a set 
C:={Al+Bl,...,A,*B,] 
of conditionals is defined as 
C(.c) := 
( 
V Ai + A (Ai + Bi) . 
l<i<n I<i<n > 
Thus C(0) = (I =+ T). The directed sum of an ordered set of conditionals 
C:=(A1jB1,...,A,=xB,} 
is defined by (i) for IZ > 0, 
S(l) := ( V Ai =$ V (AT A Bi)), 
l<i<n l<i<n 
where AT := ( A -Aj) r\&, 
l<j<i 
and (ii) S(0) := (T =+ I). Hence AT = Al, AZ = -A1 A AZ, etc. While the quasi- 
conjunction is commutative, the directed sum depends on the ordering. However, the binary 
directed sum is associative, whence iterated binary sums (this is Adams’ definition, [3, 
p. 274f1) coincide with the definition above. The proof of Lemma 7 is straightforward [1, 
p. 521. 
Lemma 7. For every C: xLE~ u(L) 2 u(C(L)). 
Lemma 8. For every ordered C: u(S(C)) > nLELIu(L). 
Proof. Terminology: w “tests” Ai + Bi iff w verifies Ai. Let 7;: denote the the set of 
worlds “testing” Li := (Ai =+ Bi); and Vi, Fi the set of worlds verifying and falsifying 
Li, respectively. SE abbreviates c(p(u) 1 u E Ti) and similar for SFi and SVi. Provided 
p(Ai) > 0, the uncertainty of Ai =+ Bi is given as 
U(Li) = 1 _ p(&) = 1 - g = =;~~~ = g 
1 I 1 
(1) 
since the worlds testing but not verifying Li are exactly those falsifying Li .-For L: = 0, 
the lemma holds by definition. If L: is a singleton it holds trivially. We prove the lemma 
5 The index ‘i’ on p. 272 of [3] should be replaced by ‘r’, and the inequalities (12a) and (12b) on p. 273 by (i) 
and (ii) above-personal correspondence. 
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for the binary directed sum. Since the binary directed sum is associative, this implies 
the lemma for nary directed sums by induction. Consider the directed sum of {Lt , L2}, 
abbreviated by LIZ. If one of the two antecedents has zero-probability, the lemma holds 
again trivially; so assume otherwise. (1) gives us the three fractions in (2) from left to 
right as the uncertainties of LIZ, L1 and L2, respectively. We have to prove the following 
inequality: 
2 >(2)(Z). (2) 
Let Tl denote the set of worlds verifying A1 A A2 and T2- the set of worlds verifying 
-A1 A AZ. Similarly, F2f the set of worlds verifying A1 A A2 A -B2 and FT the set of 
worlds verifying -A1 A A2 A -B2. Then ST2 = ST,+ + ST2-, since T2 is the disjoint union 
of Tz and ‘T2-, and on similar reasons S F2 = S Fc + SF;. Note also that Tt2, which is the 
set of worlds testing the directed sum and thus verifying (A1 v AZ), is the disjoint union of 
Tl and T2-; thus ST12 = ST1 + ST,-; on similar reasons SF12 = SF1 + SF;. Hence the 
inequality (2) is equivalent to the following: 
SF,+ + SF,- 
> 
SF1 ‘SF; + SF1 . SF2- 
ST;t + ST2- = ST1 . ST; + ST1 . ST,- ’ 
(3) 
We must prove (3). Write the leftmost term in (3) as (a + b)/(c + d) (hence a = SFl, etc.) 
and the rightmost term in (3) as (a’ + b’)/(c’ + d’) (hence a’ = SF1 . SF;, etc.). It holds 
that (i) a/c > a’/c’ because SF: < ST2+ and (ii) b/d 2 b’/d’ because SF1 6 STl. By 
simple arithmetics (i) and (ii) imply that 
a + b a’+b’ 
--a------- 
c +d c’ + d’ ’ 
hence (3). q 
Lemma 9. Zf X yields the ordered subset Y := (Yl, . . . , Y,}, then C(X) yields S(Y). 
The proof of Lemma 9 is by propositional logic [3, p. 2751. 
Lemma 10. ZfLl yields L2, then u(L1) 3 u(L2). 
The proof of Lemma 10 is straightforward (cf. [l, p. 521; [3, p. 2751). Lemmata 7,9, 10 
(applied to C(X) and S(Y)) and Lemma 8 imply our claim as follows. If X E lt yields 
the ordered subset y C &, then: 
c u(L) 3 c u(L) 3 .(C(X)) 3 u(S(Y)) 3 n u(L) 2 n u(L). 
LEISl LEX LEY LEISz 
This completes the proof of “(5) implies (3)“. q 
(4) implies (1): Straightforward (for the P-fragment cf. [14, pp. 183, 1931). q 
(5) implies (4): For proofs of Lemmata 11 and 12, see [ 1, p. 63fl. 
Lemma 11. L kNP+ C(L). 
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Lemma 12. If L1 yields L2, then L1 FNP+ Lz. 
Lemma 13. S({Ll, . . ., L,)) kNP+ V(L1,. . ., L,]. 
Proof. For L = 0 we have to show that 
(a) T + I t-NP+ 1. 
T kNP+ -(T =k I) holds by (Poss), which gives (a) by contraposition. If f, is a singleton, 
Lemma 13 holds trivially. We prove Lemma 13 for a binary directed sum. Let 
(1) := ((A v C) =+ (A A B) v (-A A C A D)), 
(2) := (A =+ B), 
(3) := (C =+ 0). 
We must prove the inference 
(b) (1) kNP+ (2)” (3). 
By (dWRM) we get the inference 
(c) (l) kNP+ (4) v (% 
where 
(4) := ((A v C) A A j (A A B) L 
(5) := (A v C =+ -A). 
We derive the inference 
(d) (4) kNP+ (2) 
by (R), (LLE), (And), (RW), and 
(e) (l), (5) l-_NP+ (6) 
by (And), (RW), where 
(6) := (A v C +- 0). 
Let 
(7):=(AvC+C). 
We prove 
(f) (5) kNP+ (7) 
by (R), (And), (RW), and 
(g) (6), (7) ENP+ (3) 
’ (-1 4 A c A D)), 
by (CM), (LLE). By propositional logic, inferences (e), (f) and (g) give us 
(h) (l), (5) kNP+ (3); 
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and (c), (d) and (h) give us (b). For nary directed sums the claim follows by induction on 
iterated binary sums. q 
We now complete the proof that (5) implies (4). First, assume X C Lr yields an 
ordered subset y c C2. Then C(X) yields S(Y) by Lemma 9. Hence by Lemma 12, 
C(X) kNp-k S(y). This together with Lemmata 11 and 13 implies that X kNp+ Y and 
hence that Lr U C FNp C2, i.e. (4). Second, assume X C LZr yields l\C + 1. By the 
same argument, X kNp+ /j C =k 1. Since 
Ck,qC kNp+ -(/jC,l) (byPoss), 
,!Zl U C ENI,+ I follows, which implies (4) by propositional logic. q 
4. Inconsistent extensions of Delgrande’s default logic 
Delgrande [9, p. 7Ofl defines a default theory as an ordered pair T = (D, C). D (“default 
statements”) is a set of unnegated or negated conditionals of LNP. C (“contingencies”) 
is a finite and consistent set of statements of Lp. According to Delgrande’s “temporary” 
suggestion [9, p. 7 11, n E Lp is default-derivable from (D, C) iff the conditional A C =+ n 
is NP-derivable from D (cf. Delgrande’s “assumption of normality” [9, p. 711). But this 
principle is too weak because it does not sanction the default detachment of q from 
([p + q}, (p, r}), where r is an additional irrelevant fact (cf. Delgrande’s “assumption 
of relevance” [9, p. 721). To sanction default reasoning via NP-inference one must pass to 
a certain dtlfault extension of D. 
Delgrande’s “first approach” starts from the observation that if (a =k y) E D and 
/3 E Lp, at least one of(i) a! A B + y and (ii) a! A -/3 j y can NP-consistently be added 
to D [9, p, 731. If /? is irrelevant, both (i) and (ii) may be added-Delgrande says that 
both conditionals are supported in D = {a + y }_ This is different in the case of conjicting 
conditionak, as in the examples 
(EXl): (]a =+ ~3 B * -v], ]a, B]) 
and 
(EX2): (Ia! =+ Y, B * -Y, o * B], to, B]). 
In (EXl) Delgrande opts for the sceptical solution: neither (11 A /l =$ y nor a! A j3 + -y 
is supported by the D of (EXl). Delgrande handles (EX2) according to the speczjicity 
principle [‘7, p. 851: cz =+ y is preferred over /l +- -y because a! is more specific than ,!l 
(which is asserted by the third conditional); hence o A p =+ y is supported by the D of 
(EX2). This leads to the following definition, where PD stands for Delgrande’s default 
inference: ” 
6 Our Definition 14( 1) corresponds to Delgrande’s Definition 5.1; our Definition 14(2) to Delgrande’s Definition 
5.2 (rewritten as in [7, p. 851) and our Definition 14.3 to Delgmnde’s Definition 5.5. 
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Definition 14. Let (D, C) be a default theory, and j3t, /3z, . . . a given enumeration of the 
formulas of Lp. 
(1) ajyissupportedinDUCiffthereisBsuchthat(i)a~B,(ii)D~~pBj~, 
and (iii) p F /I* holds for every B* with a F fi* and D U C kNP -(fi* j y). 
(2) E(Dc) (the default extension of D given C) = UiGw Ei ; where Ei is recursively 
defined as follows: 
E. := D, 
Ei+l:=EiU{a!r\Bi~vID~Npa!jyand 
a! A pi + y is supported in D U C} 
U(a!A~Bi=+~]DF~pa!=+~and 
(Y A /$ =+ y is not supported in D U C}. 
(3) (D,C)I--oa!iffDhp/\C=+cr. 
Three remarks are important: 
(1) The extension E(Dc) is independent from the ordering of Lp-formulas because, 
according to Definition 14(2), whether a! A #Ii =+ y is put into in E(Dc) depends 
only on D and C but not on Ei . 
(2) Delgrande’s Definition 14 handles the examples (EXl) and (EX2) in the intended 
way only if NP is replaced by its corrected version NP+. In particular, the specifity- 
handling of (EX2) presupposes that the D of (EX2) implies a! A B =+- y [9, p. 80]- 
this implication is NP+-valid but NP-invalid. 
(3) In Definition 14(l) Delgrande refers to D U C rather than to D alone, because he 
wants to derive -(/I* +- v) from (B* + 1~) E D and O/S* which in turn follows 
from /3* E C [9, p. 75f, footnote 41. This inference presupposes the axiom (Poss) 
which is NP+-valid but NP-invalid. 
Remarks (2) and (3) confirm our claim of Section 2 that NP+ but not NP was Delgrande’s 
“intended” logic. 
Delgrande’s first main theorem (Theorem 5.3 on [9, p. 751) says that E(Dc) is consistent 
whenever D is consistent. Independent from the choice among NP and NP+, Delgrande’s 
default logic does not behave according to this theorem: it may produce inconsistent 
extensions. This is shown by the following counterexample. To verify claims about 
Delgrande’s relation of support we introduce three finite ranked models Ml, MT, Ms, each 
consisting of just two worlds wo <R wt. a + p is said to befirst veri$ed by world w E M 
iff w is minimal among all worlds verifying CY A fi. Obviously, a + /l is (nonvacuously) 
valid in M whenever a! =+ /l is first verified by some w E M. 
Counterexample. Propositional variables: pt , ~2, ~3, q, r 
D = {Pi * q, P2 =+ r, P3 * (r -+ -q), -(PI A p2 A p3 =$ I)] 
C = iP11 P2? P31 
a! ranges over Lp-formulas with p1 A p2 A p3 t- cx 
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Model World True literals Conditionals first verified 
Ml w 0 m~p2,-~3~9~r p1jq,p2jr,a!jqifa!trueatwg 
w1 p17p2,p3,9y-r p3*(r-+-q),a+qifa!falseatwg 
M2 w 0 p1,-p2,-p3,qTr p1*q,cx*1if(~trueatwg 
w1 ~1, ~2, ~3. -9, r p2 * r, p3 * (r -+ -9). (Y * r if a! false at wg 
M3 w 0 p1,-p2,-p3,4,-r pljq,aj(rjlq)if(~trueatwo 
Wl Pl,p2~p3~-4,’ p2 * r, p3 * (r + lq), a =+ (r + 14) if cx 
false at wo 
To facilitate the understanding of Observations l-5, recall the meaning of the negated 
conditional in (iii) Definition 14(l) of “support”: D kNP -(a + fi) means that in every 
model-world pair (M, W) verifying D, a! + p is false. (This is different from the meaning 
of a! p b in the rational monotony property of [ 15, pp. 18, 291 which merely asserts the 
existence of a D-model falsifying (Y + @ .) 
Observation 1. 
(i) All conditionals of D are valid in (i.e., true at all worlds oJ) Ml, A42 and M3. 
(ii) C i,s true at wl (the generating world) of Ml, M2 and M3; thus ‘(~1 A p2 A p3 
=+ -1) is valid in Ml, M2 and M3. So, 
(iii) D CJ C is NPf- as well as NP-consistent. q 
Observation 2. p1 A p2 A p3 + q is supported in D U C. 
Proof. For each cz logically contained in p1 A p2 A p3, ~(a + q) is neither NP- nor NPf- 
derivable from D U C, because a! +=- q is first verified at wu or at WI in MI and thus is 
valid in M 1. So by Observation l(iii), -(a + q) is NP+- as well as NP-consistent with 
DUC. CI 
Observation 3. p1 A p2 A p3 =+ r is supported in D U C. 
Proof. As for Observation 2, but with help of M2. 17 
Observation 4. pl A p2 A p3 + (r + -q) is supported in D U C. 
Proof. As for Observation 2, but with help of M3. q 
Observation 5. E(Dc) is NP- and thus NP+-inconsistent. 
Proof. EC&) contains PI A p2 A p3 4’ q, ~1 A ~2 A ~3 + r, p1 A p2 A p3 j (r + -4) 
(by Observations 24). So 
(iv) PI /y p2 A p3 =+ 1 is NP- as well as NP+-derivable from D U C by (And) and 
(RW). 
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But D U C also contains 
(v) -(Pl Af’2Af’3 * 1). 
(iv) and (v) imply Observation 5. q 
Observations 1 and 5 show that independent from the choice among NP and NP+, 
Delgrande’s first main theorem (Theorem 5.3, [9]) is false. Delgrande’s second main 
theorem (Theorem 5.9, [9]) claims that his first definition of default inference (our 
Definition 14) coincides with his second definition of default inference (Definitions 56 
5.8, [9]). It is straightforward to verify that default inference in Delgrande’s second 
definition must preserve consistency. On this reason, also Delgrande’ second main theorem 
is false: the two definitions do not coincide. 
5. Conclusion 
Delgrande’s conditional logic, if corrected in the described way, has several advanta- 
geous properties: it includes negated conditionals, it discriminates between weak and full 
rational monotony, and its propositional part has an infinitesimal and a noninfinitesimal 
probabilistic interpretation. The question whether these kinds of probabilistic semantics 
can be generalized to the first order language is so far an open problem. On the other hand, 
the mistake in Delgrande’s default logic seems not to be repairable by easy means. To find 
a unique extension of D by adding supported conditionals is more complicated than what 
is suggested in Definition 14. This is substantiated by the results of Lehmann and Magidor 
[ 15, Chapter 51. The authors consider maximally consistent extensions of D closed un- 
der the rules of NP+-so-called rational extensions. The difference between (WRM) and 
(RM) vanishes if D is maximally consistent, because then L 4 D iff -L E D. The authors 
show that not all D’s have rational extensions E(D) which are ‘perfect’ in the sense that 
every L E E(D) is supported by D [ 15, p. 301. This result does not contradict Delgrande’s 
theorem, since Delgrande’s E( DC) need not be maximally consistent, but it points into the 
same direction as our result. 
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